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Reason and Authority in Legal Ethics
W. Bradley Wendel*

Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee
University
A fairly stable debate has developed in legal ethics between
those who argue that a lawyer should always act on the balance
of first-order moral reasons as they would apply to a similarly
situated non-lawyer actor, and those who believe that a lawyer
may not deliberate on the basis of ordinary first-order moral
reasons, because of some feature of the lawyer’s role.1 Some
have called the second position the “dominant view” to
emphasize the pervasiveness of this reasoning among
practicing lawyers.2 The slogan of the dominant view is “zealous
representation within the bounds of law,” a phrase taken from
an early set of rules regulating the practice of law.3 This
definition includes not only adversarial litigation, but also
negotiations, business transactions, client counseling, and
regulatory compliance matters. In all cases, holds the dominant
view, once the lawyer and client have established a professional
relationship, the lawyer is required to make her best efforts to
further the client’s legally permissible ends, as long as these
activities will not expose the lawyer or client to some risk of
legal liability. Some who adhere to the dominant view believe
that a lawyer may be criticized in moral terms for accepting a
particular representation, or for failing to withdraw if legally
permissible,4 but even this weaker version of the dominant
view would require a lawyer to exclude first-order moral
considerations from her deliberations, unless those reasons
were aimed at a conclusion that the lawyer should not begin
working on a matter, or should attempt to withdraw. Similarly,
some dominant view proponents permits lawyers to engage
their clients in moral conversation, making reference to firstorder moral reasons, but if this conversation fails to change
the client’s mind, the lawyer is required to follow the client’s
lawful instructions.
Although the basic principle of the dominant view is that
a lawyer should disregard otherwise applicable first-order moral
reasons when representing a client, the dominant view is
generally justified on the basis of countervailing moral reasons
that also exist at the first order. Stephen Pepper argues, for
example, that the role of the lawyer is justified on the grounds
that it furthers the client’s autonomy, which is a moral good for
the client.5 Similarly, Charles Fried appeals to the intrinsic
values of loyalty and friendship embodied in the lawyer-client
relationship.6 Alternatively, one might make a straightforwardly
consequentialist argument, pointing to the benefits of some
act required by the lawyer’s professional duties. For example,
it may be the case that the long-run benefits of increased trust
between lawyers and clients, which leads to enhanced
compliance by clients with the law, are sufficiently significant
to outweigh the costs of secret-keeping by lawyers, when
disclosure of confidential information might have averted some
harm to a third party. In any event, these arguments are
supposed to underwrite a broad preclusion of most first-order
values from the lawyer’s deliberation. For example, a specific
conclusion of the dominant view might be that a lawyer should
not consider the harm to third parties as a reason against
assisting a client in resisting a regulatory requirement.
The arguments for the dominant view are said to issue in
permissions to engage in what would otherwise be morally
wrongful conduct. Thus, lawyers are subject to a “roledifferentiated” system of morality.7 The metaphor of roledifferentiation imagines actors in situations that are identical

in all morally relevant respects, but subject to differing duties,
which vary according to whether the actor occupies a given
social role.8 We might ask whether it is possible to describe
two morally identical situations, which vary only in respect of
whether the actor occupies a social role or not. When David
Luban wishes to criticize the lawyer’s obligation to keep client
confidences, he imagines a case from the domain of ordinary
morality: Suppose Salieri swears you to secrecy and confides
that he is slowly poisoning Mozart to death.9 He then draws
from this analogy to argue that the lawyers representing Ford
Motor Company should have warned potential victims, or the
appropriate regulatory agency, of dangerous defects in the
fuel system of the Pinto. The trouble with this argument is
that the lawyer for Ford is acting within a complex institutional
structure that is set up precisely to supersede ordinary moral
reasoning. At the level of first-order reasons for action, we
may disagree about the level of care that a manufacturer owes
consumers when designing and building a product. Some may
desire extensive protection, with the cost passed on to
consumers; others may prefer that the product cost less, with
the onus on consumers to purchase first-party insurance against
potential accident losses. The value of providing access to
inexpensive, albeit somewhat less safe cars may outweigh
the reduced risk of accidents if all the cars in the world were
required to be as safe as Volvos. In any event, these normative
questions are channeled into procedures for producing
definitive resolutions of the disputes. In the case of product
manufacturers, the legal rule that has developed is roughly
that a manufacturer need not take safety precautions whose
marginal cost outweighs the expected marginal benefit, in
terms of savings in accident costs. One may disagree morally
with this rule, but the process for arriving at it serves to
distinguish the Ford Pinto case from the example of Salieri
poisoning Mozart to death. Salieri cannot justify his actions by
pointing to a rule generated by an orderly process for resolving
normative disagreement. The process may or may not be
sufficient to supersede the actor’s moral deliberation (that is
the subject of this article), but it does change the morally
relevant description of the two situations under comparison.
For this reason, I believe talk of role-differentiation is
misleading.
Whether or not they talk in terms of roles, opponents of
the dominant view can be divided into two camps — call them
moralists and legalists.10 The moralists, who comprise the
majority of dominant view critics, locate the relevant values
that should bear on lawyers’ actions within the domain of
ordinary morality. For example, Luban responds to Pepper
that autonomy is not a moral good in itself, but is only
instrumentally valuable in permitting a person to accomplish
her ends. Whether those ends are themselves worthy is a
further moral question that must be answered before we can
evaluate the permissibility of the lawyer’s assistance. The
legalists, represented most prominently by William Simon, offer
a very different critique. For Simon, the values that bear on
the evaluation of a lawyer’s actions are internal to the legal
system. Because a lawyer’s work on behalf of a client involves
the interpretation and application of law, the moral
permissibility of the lawyer’s assistance to a client turns on
whether the client is legally entitled to realize some goal; and
his critique of the dominant view is that it requires lawyers to
pursue clients’ ends regardless of legal entitlement. Simon’s
legalism does not mean that ordinary moral values are
completely excluded from the lawyer’s deliberation, however.
Simon professes to be influenced by Ronald Dworkin, who
claims that “propositions of law are true if they figure in or
follow from the principles of justice, fairness, and procedural
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due process that provide the best constructive interpretation
of the community’s legal practice.”11 As Dworkin recognizes,
verifying propositions of law through reference to the virtue
of integrity requires a large-scale constructive political
argument, in which moral principles such as fairness and justice
are prominently featured. For Dworkin, integrity provides a
touchstone for resolving conflicts between competing legal
principles, such as individual responsibility and loss-spreading,
or freedom of contract and substantive fairness. Simon needs
something like Dworkinian integrity in his system of lawyers’
ethics; otherwise, lawyers would make arbitrary or standardless
decisions about how to act as representatives of their clients.
Because these decisions directly affect the clients’ legal
entitlements, any unguided ethical discretion exercised by
lawyers threatens the rule of law.
Both the dominant view and its moralistic and legalistic
competitors share one important characteristic: In prescribing
the lawyer’s deliberations, none of these ethical theories gives
much weight to the fact that the client’s action is permissible
under the law. For the dominant view, the law is treated only
instrumentally, as a means for setting boundaries around
permissible state interference with the client’s autonomy. The
source of the lawyer ’s ethical obligation is the value of
autonomy, not anything intrinsic to the law. The moralists
similarly discount the fact of legal permissibility, pointing out
that legal entitlements are not conclusive of moral rights —
one may have a legal right to do something morally wrongful.12
Luban argues that dominant-view lawyers exhibit disrespect
for the law by using it instrumentally, but his own theory of
“moral activist” (one could call it “natural law”) lawyering
disrespects law in a different way, by treating the client’s legal
right as irrelevant to the lawyer’s deliberations unless it is
morally justifiable on grounds independent of its being a law.
The legalist critics seem to have the greatest stake in the
legitimacy of legal rights, but the most prominent member of
this group, Simon, takes a rather surprising tack in the direction
of natural law, arguing that apparent legal entitlements are not
really part of the law unless they track moral principles.13 Moral
reasoning is essential to the process of legal reasoning for
Simon, as it is for Dworkin, because selecting among
competing legal principles is ultimately a question of the
constructive interpretation of the entire legal system, guided
by principles of political morality. In Simon’s view, if legal texts
are interpreted correctly, the morally correct thing for a lawyer
to do will also be the legally correct thing to do. Thus, for all of
these ethical theories, first-order moral principles are in the
driver’s seat, with legality being only a prudential constraint
on action.14
The relatively low deliberative significance of legality in
legal ethics is unsurprising, in light of the conventional wisdom
in political philosophy, holding that there is no general obligation
to obey the law. 15 The traditional arguments offered in
justification of a general duty to obey — express and implied
consent, gratitude, fairness, and utility — have all been
subjected to devastating criticism. For this reason, hardly
anyone writing on legal ethics believes that a legal obligation
or permission is conclusive of moral deliberation. A moral
“ought” must rather be based on all-things-considered
deliberation on first-order reasons for action. An action is
morally permitted or required only if morally permitted or
required on its own merits, so to speak, leaving aside any
general considerations of legality. From the client’s
perspective, this sort of reasoning makes a legal entitlement
meaningless. A dominant view lawyer would of course assist
the client in taking advantage of the legal entitlement, but
only because that lawyer is dedicated to the value of autonomy.

If the client has a lawyer who disagrees with the dominant
view, however, the client cannot obtain technical assistance
to pursue certain legally permissible ends. In Hohfeldian terms,
the client’s claim-right to X is rendered empty by severing its
connection with a duty on the part of the lawyer to facilitate
the client’s access to X.16 The lawyer is, in effect, overriding
the client’s legal entitlement to X on the basis of moral reasons.
If the client does not share those reasons, the client is likely to
feel betrayed by the lawyer’s refusal to provide assistance.
One response to this problem is that the client does not
have a moral claim-right to X, so the lawyer does not have a
correlative moral duty to assist the client in obtaining X. Thus,
the client is not wronged by the lawyer, morally speaking. For
the client not to believe herself to be morally wronged by the
lawyer’s refusal to assist her in obtaining X, the client must
agree with the lawyer’s moral reasoning, the conclusion of
which is that the client does not have a moral right to X. Critics
of the dominant view, in effect, assume a fairly wide scope of
agreement among lawyers and clients over the morality of the
clients’ ends. The possibility of moral disagreement between
lawyers and clients appears to count in favor of the dominant
view, because the client’s autonomy is lexically prior to the
other values considered by the lawyer in her own deliberation.
The familiar objection raised here is that the client’s autonomy,
by itself, is not a reason for the lawyer to do anything. Perhaps
the lawyer has made an express or implied promise to further
the client’s lawful projects, but this response simply invites
the further objection that one cannot be morally bound by a
promise to do an immoral act.17 From the standpoint of the
lawyer’s moral agency, then, a promise to assist clients in
realizing their legal entitlements does not eliminate the
problem of the lawyer’s perceived complicity in immorality
which results from assisting the client. There seems to be no
reason for the lawyer to accept a moral constraint, to the effect
that the client’s autonomy should be lexically prior to the
reasons the lawyer would otherwise take into account as a
deliberating agent, including reasons that would require her
to disassociate herself from another person’s immoral projects.
Examples of cases raising this problem are familiar from
the legal ethics literature: A client wishes to draft a will
disinheriting his son for opposing the Vietnam war,18 a large
agribusiness client seeks to exploit a loophole in a statute
intended to benefit family farmers,19 a manufacturer of medical
devices asks the lawyer to slow down the regulatory process
through non-frivolous legal means in order to continue selling
products the lawyer believes are defective,20 the lawyer is
bound by the legal duty of confidentiality not to reveal
information that could save the lives of others.21 If we assume
in each case that the moral dialogue between lawyer and client
has reached an impasse, and the client insists on the lawyer
assisting her in obtaining the relevant legal entitlement, the
client and lawyer will in effect be disagreeing about whether
the client has a moral claim-right to the entitlement. In the
face of such a disagreement, the dominant view mandates
that the lawyer defer to the client’s resolution of the moral
issues, notwithstanding the principle that one ought to take
responsibility for one’s actions and reason autonomously to a
conclusion about what one ought to do. 22 Critics of the
dominant view similarly accept the imposition of moral reasons
by one person on another, in this case by permitting the lawyer
to refuse to provide assistance to the client in obtaining a legal
entitlement that the client believes herself to be morally
permitted to obtain. The dominant view and its opponents
therefore seem to be arguing for competing priority principles,
which justify subordinating the moral agency of one of the
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parties — lawyer or client — to the other’s judgment about
how to proceed.
Talk of subordinating one’s judgment to another ’s
resolution of a practical dilemma calls to mind the concept of
legitimate authority and the justification of a moral obligation
to obey the law. As observed previously, most political
philosophers do not accept a general duty to obey the law, so
it appears that the law is of little assistance in these cases
where either the lawyer or the client seeks to hold the other
to a resolution of disputed moral issues. But there is a different
way to understand the authority of law, which places moral
disagreement at the foreground of a theory of legitimacy.23
Rather than assuming that disagreement between lawyers and
clients is a marginal case, this theory of authority begins from
the assumption that disagreement is widespread, and that the
authority of law depends on its capacity to enable collective
social action in the face of persistent disagreement. On this
account of authority, the first-order moral disagreement
between the lawyer and client, concerning the permissibility
of the client’s ends, or the means by which she seeks to achieve
them, may be dealt with by considering the second-order
reasons given by the law.
Jeremy Waldron observes the intractability of good-faith
disagreement on moral and political questions, and argues that
the fact of disagreement provides second-order reasons not
to act peremptorily on first-order beliefs about the good or
justice.24 In the political domain, action on the basis of
considerations of justice, fairness, rights, or the good is of an
essentially collective, or social character. It does not make
sense to think about action in a sphere governed by the law as
being grounded in an individual decision about what one ought
to do. Rather, individuals bring only provisional or partial beliefs
or views to a process of collective debate and resolution.25 It
is crucial to this process that no person’s views about rights or
justice should be accorded greater weight than others’ views.
People may attempt to persuade their fellow citizens, but in
the end, when all the speeches and lobbying efforts are
concluded, everyone submits his or her own beliefs about
justice to a vote, and some faction’s view becomes the position
taken by society as a whole on the disputed issue. Although it
does not directly represent each affected citizen’s vote, the
democratic process nevertheless exhibits the virtue of being
respectful to the competing views of those with whom we
disagree, consistent with the felt need to reach a decision and
put an end to the process of deliberation and attempts at
persuasion.26 When we think in a philosophical mindset about
matters of justice, we naturally believe we are right and that
our view should prevail, although we acknowledge that others
disagree with us.27 When we are dealing with politics, however,
the “felt need, shared by the disputants, for common action in
spite of such disagreement”28 impels us toward a procedural
resolution of the dispute, with a view to settling on a single,
definitive position representing our collective solution.
How can the result of this process be authoritative with
respect to individuals who are subject to the resulting legal
obligations? Granting that collective action in the face of moral
disagreement is often necessary, acting on the basis of a law
with which one disagrees appears to involve an abdication of
one’s moral agency, or acting in bad faith, as Sartre would call
it. The most promising way to justify the legitimacy of a legal
directive, and therefore to provide a second-order reason for
an individual to comply with it notwithstanding its conflict
with her moral beliefs, is to appeal to reasons that apply
independently of the law to the person subject to the directive.
This is the account of authority offered by Joseph Raz, upon
which Waldron relies in his book. For Raz, authority is

legitimate when compliance with authoritative directives is a
better way to achieve some end that an agent has, as compared
with the agent trying to work out the balance of reasons for
himself. 29 The justification for following expert authority
obviously works in this way.30 If I want to make a good brown
beef stock, I would do better at that end by following Jacques
Pépin’s instructions than by trying to work out the procedure
myself. Significantly, I am not acting in bad faith or
subordinating my will to Pépin, because in following his
directives I am acting on the basis of reasons that are my own
— namely, the desire to make a good brown beef stock. The
same is true for legal authority in some cases. Raz is actually
very cautious about justifying legal authority along these lines.
Although he calls this the “normal justification thesis,” he
believes there are many cases in which a legal official does
not have superior expertise with respect to some end that is
shared with the subject of the legal directive.31 Legal directives
are legitimate only where the ostensible authority can claim
expertise by virtue of being wiser, better informed, steadier of
will, more efficient in decisionmaking, or better positioned to
accomplish some objective, as compared with individuals. We
can see how this model of legitimacy works with respect to
something like a regulation requiring that a drug be sold only
on a physician’s prescription. Presumably the physicians
working for the Food and Drug Administration are better than
most individuals at figuring out whether a drug needs to be
taken under medical supervision. For the government to claim
superior expertise in working out purely normative issues,
however, seems either arrogant or risible — no one believes
that the U.S. Congress is a better moral decisionmaker than a
reasonably thoughtful citizen.
Waldron’s insight is that we all do share reasons that would
justify deferring the resolution of normative issues to a
lawmaking body. We all perceive the need for coordinated
action in the “circumstances of politics,” that is, in the condition
of coexisting with others with whom we do not share beliefs
about the good, justice, or rights.32 Another way to put the
point is that we are disputatious but sociable creatures by
nature; we each seek our own advantage, but we have a desire
for peaceable society with one another.33 From the standpoint
of each affected citizen, one does better at living in a
harmonious society with other quarrelsome beings by
following legal directives, which are established pursuant to a
process for treating disagreements fairly, with due respect for
the moral agency of other citizens. To the extent that one
wishes to treat one’s fellow citizens respectfully in normative
disagreements, one has a dependent reason, in Raz’s sense,34
which is taken into account by the process of resolving disputes
through the means of the law. Following Raz further, this reason
preempts recourse to the first-order moral reasons that were
the subject of the disagreement. Because the citizen is now
subject to a legitimate legal directive, she has a reason not to
rely on these first-order reasons in her deliberation about how
to act.
Even if one accepts this outline of the justification of
authority for citizens, the further question remains of how it
may be extended to preempt recourse by lawyers to firstorder moral reasons. If the need to act collectively in the face
of disagreement is a Razian reason for citizens, which they do
better at by following legal directives than by trying to work
out the balance of competing values on their own, it still does
not appear to be a reason for lawyers, who are acting on behalf
of someone else, as representatives, advisors, or advocates.
We still need a Razian reason for lawyers. One plausible
candidate for this reason is the obligation of respect we owe
to the law, in light of the kind of achievement it represents.
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Because the law enables collective action notwithstanding
deep and persistent disagreement, it ought to be taken
seriously, in the sense that one ought not to try to come up
with ways to nullify, defy, or evade the law.35 Lawyers have a
great deal of power to do harm here, by undermining the
collective achievement of lawmaking by structuring
transactions to evade statutory or regulatory requirements.
They may also interfere with the operation of the law by
resisting it on moral grounds. If the lawyer says to the client, in
effect, “You have a legal entitlement to X but I refuse to assist
you in obtaining that entitlement for moral reasons,” then the
lawyer is simply reinscribing in the attorney-client relationship
the very moral disagreement the law was intended to preempt.
Thus, a theor y of legal ethics that is respectful of the
achievement represented by law must build in an ethical
constraint to the effect that lawyers should further the end of
facilitating collective action in the face of disagreement.
The argument outlined here differs from the usual
defense of the dominant view because it does not depend on
first-order moral values like the client’s autonomy or the
intrinsic value of the lawyer-client relationship. Rather, this
kind of modified dominant view is justified at the second order
of reasons, by considerations relating to the reasons for treating
legal directives as authoritative. These reasons are preemptive
of the first-order moral considerstions that would ordinarily
give the lawyer a sufficient reason not to assist the client in
realizing her ends. The conception sketched here differs
further from the usual specification of the dominant view in
that it gives reasons for lawyers to respect the law,
notwithstanding their clients’ wishes, in some cases. Suppose
the client wishes to set up a transaction to exploit a loophole
in a statute, forum-shop for a judge predisposed to rule in her
favor, or take advantage of the underfunding of state
enforcement resources by playing the “audit lottery.” The
normal dominant view would direct lawyers to assist clients in
these projects, as long as they were not illegal under applicable
law. The Waldronian dominant view, however, would call upon
lawyers to respect the achievement represented by the law
— that is, its capacity to facilitate collective action in the face
of disagreement.36 In cases where the lawyer’s actions would
in effect undermine the capacity of the law to serve as a focal
point for social action, they would be ruled out on secondorder moral grounds. Interestingly, the lawyer’s obligation here
is aligned with the traditional role of “officer of the court”
which is appealed to frequently by opponents of the dominant
view.
I offer this argument for the authority-based conception
of legal ethics only tentatively at this point, because some
difficulties remain to be worked out. One source of concern
is its strongly utilitarian nature.37 The authority of law, for
Waldron at least, is based on the good of collective social action
in spite of normative disagreement. In other words, a great
deal of benefit is created by legal ordering, so the obligation to
respect the law is given on utilitarian grounds. This is true
despite the possibility that the laws interfere with the moral
rights of some citizens. Waldron’s response would of course
be that we disagree about what moral rights we have, so these
can never be the basis for a theory of authority, but this
response begs a deeper question of whether individual rights
— even those that are contested — can be sacrificed in the
name of collective action. It is usually thought to be the whole
point of rights that they block the majority from interfering
with some interest of individuals that is of fundamental moral
importance.38
A further objection is related to Waldron’s claim that a
statute provides a single, definitive resolution of a disputed

normative question. What if, contrary to this suggestion, there
are multiple reasonable ways of reading a statutory provision,
and lawyers may disagree in good faith about which is the
correct approach? As a reviewer of his book pointed out,
Waldron does not say much about how ambiguous statutes
should be interpreted.39 He does not naively plump for a plain
meaning or “dictionary” rule favored by Justice Scalia, but I do
not think he is sufficiently worried about the possibility that
the normative disagreements that were supposed to have
been superseded by legislation arise again in the process of
interpreting legal texts. The interpretive attitude taken by
lawyers and judges toward statutes and common-law decisions
can have a great deal of beneficial or harmful effect on the
capacity of those legal texts to enable collective social action.
One does not have to believe that words have no
determinate meaning in order to be troubled by some of the
interpretive issues that courts deal with routinely. Does a
statute prohibiting the interstate transportation of motor
vehicles apply to airplanes?40 Does a prohibition on “using” a
gun in connection with a drug trafficking offense cover the act
of driving around with a loaded gun in the trunk of a car?41 Not
only are these statutes ambiguous, but the sorts of political
disagreements they were intended to resolve, for example
over the scope of the legitimate role of government in society,
are recapitulated as statutory-interpretation issues. A person
who believes that negative liberty is prior to equality or other
positive rights is likely to support a principle of statutory
interpretation that the words of legislation should be read
narrowly, or that Congress should not be presumed to have
the constitutional power to legislate on some matter.
Reasonable lawyers can disagree about the interpretive attitude
one ought to take toward the law. One principle might be that
it is wrong to exploit loopholes, where a loophole is defined as
a reading of the literal text of the statute in a way that is contrary
to its obvious purpose. Of course, another lawyer might argue
that one person’s loophole is just another person’s clever or
aggressive legal position, and if Congress had intended to
prevent the activity in question, it would have drafted the text
with greater specificity. It seems like some kind of metastatute is needed, specifying how statutes should be
interpreted, but of course even a meta-statute would be
subject to disagreement at the level of interpretation. Thus,
lawyers’ interpretive attitudes are a critical variable in the
effectiveness of the law in resolving disagreement and
providing a focal point for collective action.
Having raised these as two of several difficulties with the
authority-based justification of the dominant view, I do think it
provides a more philosophically robust defense of this
conception of lawyers’ ethics than its competitors. It brings
legality closer to the center of issues relating to legal ethics,
rather than relegating it to the periphery. It also assumes that
moral disagreement is not a marginal case, but the backdrop
against which we think about professional roles in the first
place. If there was no disagreement, there would be no need
for law. As Grant Gilmore quipped, “In Heaven there will be
no law, and the lion will lie down with the lamb. In Hell there
will be nothing but law, and due process will be meticulously
observed.”42 Until we achieve heaven on earth, a theory of
legal ethics must not assume that lions and lambs will be able
to agree about their respective rights.
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“In this article we use some simple tools from game theory
and behavioral economics to cast light on the maintenance
and disruption of unequal relationships through private action
and through law.” The authors of this article deal with the
following type of situation. In social life there are many
inequalities, states of affairs in which some are advantaged
and others, often a larger number, are disadvantaged. Not
surprisingly, some (though not all) of these inequalities are
regarded as unjust and produce indignation among the
disadvantaged. Nevertheless, such inequalities often persist
because altering the status quo would be harmful to both the
advantaged and the disadvantaged, and both sides know it (in
game theoretical terms, the status quo is an equilibrium). Yet
despite this, people are sometimes willing to accept losses in
the effort to alter the status quo, and a credible threat of such
a disruption can lead to an alteration. The aim of UllmannMargalit’s and Sunstein’s article is to make a case for each of
the foregoing claims and to show that law can play a role, on
either side, in entrenching or altering relative advantages.
The authors review empirical evidence suggesting that
indignation often leads the disadvantaged to risk their material
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